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Recent empirical research based on plant-level data 
has consistently shown that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in productivity across units even within 
narrowly defined sectors in any given period of time. 
Thus, as several studies document, the reallocation of 
inputs and factors of production is a crucial element of 
aggregate productivity gains and growth.1 
New models based on firm heterogeneity have 
analysed these intra-industry effects in the context of 
international trade. Melitz (2003) and Bernard and others 
(2003) developed alternative models of international 
trade which predict that only the most productive firms 
export and that industry’s exposure to trade induces 
aggregate productivity gains through reallocation —an 
effect that is ignored by the standard representative 
firm framework. At the same time, a growing body of 
empirical literature has studied the extent and causes of 
productivity differentials between exporters and non-
exporters.2 Little evidence exists on the importance of 
trade-driven reallocation effects.
In the light of these new theoretical developments, 
this paper analyses the sources of the Chilean export 
boom and its relationship to productivity heterogeneity 
at the microeconomic level. Using a sample of Chilean 
manufacturing plants for the years from 1990 to 2007, we 
decompose observed aggregate export growth into two 
complementary sets of margins: net entry into foreign 
markets versus resource reallocation effects, and export 
intensity changes versus sales growth. We also consider 
  We are grateful to the National Institute of Statistics (ine) for 
providing the manufacturing plant-level data used in this paper. We 
are also grateful to the cepal Review referee and to participants at a 
number of seminars for helpful comments and suggestions. Excellent 
research assistance was provided by Pablo Muñoz. We acknowledge 
financial support from the Inter-American Development Bank (idb) and 
from the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development 
(fondecyt) (grant no. 1070805).
1  For Chile, see Bergoeing, Hernando and Repetto (2010).
2  See Wagner (2007 and 2008) and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008) 
for recent surveys. The evidence indicates that the most productive 
firms self-select as export market entrants. Although there is mixed 
evidence on export-driven learning effects, Álvarez and López (2005) 
confirm this hypothesis using plant-level data for Chile.
the role of efficiency by correlating export growth with 
both within-plant productivity growth and between-plant 
productivity-enhancing reallocation effects. 
The Chilean experience is interesting for several 
reasons. First, the economy underwent a deep and 
far-reaching trade liberalization reform starting in the 
mid-1970s. During the 30 years that followed, Chilean 
exports grew at an average real annual rate of 6%. This 
export boom dramatically changed the level of trade 
as well as its composition and the productive structure 
of the economy. Although there was a partial reversal 
of the unilateral tariff reduction process after the early 
1980s crisis, trade liberalization continued after 1985. 
Since 1992, furthermore, trade policy has moved towards 
bilateral agreements. In fact, Chile has signed trade 
agreements with more than 50 countries over the last two 
decades, including the United States, Canada, Mexico, 
the European Union, China and the Republic of Korea. 
Thus, the data considered in this study cover a period 
that came after more than a decade of major reforms, 
but that was also characterized by active negotiation of 
preferential trade agreements. Consequently, this time 
period provides a rich environment for research in pursuit 
of a better understanding of the link between trade and 
industrial and plant dynamics. 
Our findings are consistent with the predictions of 
the new theories of heterogeneous firms and trade. First, 
64.4% of the increase in exports came from larger and 
highly intensive new exporters, rather than being the 
result of rising export intensity at existing exporters. 
Second, productivity and exports have co-moved over 
the Chilean boom. Finally, the export expansion has been 
associated with a productivity-enhancing reallocation 
of resources towards more efficient plants. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II provides an overview of trade reforms and the 
recent trade boom in Chile. Section III describes the data 
we use and presents a number of plant-level facts that 
characterize manufacturing exports. Section IV dissects 
exports to explore the main sources of growth. We also 
study the link between export growth and productivity. 
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In June 2002, Chile signed a free trade agreement with 
the European Union; a year later, a similar agreement 
was signed with the United States. These negotiations 
marked the culmination of three decades of free-trade 
policies that have consolidated Chile’s position as one 
of the most open economies in the world.
Today, few question the significance of the trade 
liberalization programme initiated in the mid-1970s in 
shaping the economic transformation of Chile.3 The 
situation was very different four decades ago, however. 
By the late 1960s, trade restrictions had practically 
isolated the Chilean economy from the rest of the world, 
exacerbating its dependence on copper exports and 
confining imports to intermediate and capital goods. The 
structure of relative prices was drastically distorted in 
favour of industrial goods at the expense of agricultural, 
mining and other tradable activities. Differential import 
duties exempted capital goods, and high taxes were 
levied on final goods, creating a generally inefficient 
capital-intensive industrial sector. Import tariffs ranged 
from 0% for capital goods to 750% for luxury goods, 
a 90-day non-interest-bearing deposit of 10,000% of 
the cif value of imported goods was required, and all 
import operations required administrative approval. In 
addition, a system of multiple exchange rates was in 
operation, with a 52 to 1 ratio having been reached by 
the time the economy collapsed in 1973.
In the years that followed the 1973 crisis, trade 
liberalization policies were to be the cornerstone of the 
transformation of the inward-oriented Chilean economy 
into a dynamic export-oriented one. The initial set of 
trade reforms were intended to simplify the structure 
of the economy. Consistently, exchange markets were 
unified, most non-tariff barriers (quotas and prohibitions) 
were eliminated, and tariffs were drastically reduced to 
a uniform 10% by 1979. 
The economy recovered at great speed during the 
years from 1976 to 1980, with gross domestic product 
3  The Chilean economic transformation has been extensively 
documented by Edwards and Edwards (1992) and Corbo and Fischer 
(1994), among others. 
(gdp) growing at an annual rate of 7%. Moreover, the 
availability of foreign goods expanded markedly and the 
government deficit turned into a surplus. In addition, a 
large number of reforms were initiated to complement 
and reinforce the change in relative prices induced by 
trade deregulation. Among them, a large number of 
public enterprises were privatized, labour markets were 
deregulated, a defined contribution social security system 
was set up to replace the pay-as-you-go system, and health 
and public education responsibilities were transferred 
from the ministries to the municipality level. 
Although reforms advanced on several fronts, two 
major problems remained unsolved: unemployment did 
not decline significantly, and inflation remained stubbornly 
high. Among the instruments used to control inflation, 
the fixing of the nominal exchange rate in June 1979 
proved devastating in its effects. The highly indexed 
nature of the economy, in combination with the fixed 
exchange rate, induced an increasing real overvaluation 
of the currency, fostering imports and discouraging 
exports, and leading to large current account deficits. 
In 1981, the external deficit reached 14.5% of gdp. 
Large amounts of foreign loans entered the country 
to finance the trade imbalance and, as a consequence, 
the foreign debt increased from US$ 6 billion in 1977 
to US$ 14.8 billion in 1981. Two additional elements 
also helped induce the observed rise in indebtedness: 
the resistance of the real interest rate to convergence 
on world levels and the deregulation of the financial 
market in 1981. The former induced a continuous flow 
of short-term lending; the lack of adequate supervision 
of bank portfolio quality in the latter led to a general 
miscalculation of risk levels and imprudent domestic 
lending (Barandiarán and Hernández, 1999).
With such a large trade imbalance, confidence 
in the Chilean economy faltered, and foreign lending 
ceased. In June 1982 the authorities were forced to 
devalue the peso by 19%, but “it was too little and too 
late” (Edwards and Edwards, 1992). The economy fell 
into a deep recession as gdp dropped by 13.4% in 1982 
and a further 3.5% in 1983; unemployment, already 
high, skyrocketed to 34% of the labour force (including 
emergency employment programmes). The government 
II
Trade reforms and the Chilean export boom:  
an overview 
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deficit increased to almost 9% of gdp, and the central 
bank had to rescue the financial sector from bankruptcy. 
Foreign debt reached 130% of gdp by 1983.
This recession led the authorities to partially 
reverse trade opening policies. In particular, the mean 
tariff was raised to 26% by 1985. After that, however, 
the reduction in tariffs resumed. In 1990, with the 
return to democracy, the commitment to openness was 
not modified. In fact, average tariffs continued to be 
reduced in a gradual manner from nearly 15% in 1988 
to about 3% in 2010. Figure 1 reports the evolution of 
mean tariffs since 1975. 
One important change defined trade policy during 
the 1990s: bilateral agreements were incorporated into 
FIGURE 1























































































Chile: gdp and total exports, 1975-2010
(Index 1975 = 100)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Since Bernard and Jensen (1995), a growing literature 
has described various regularities characterizing 
exporters’ behaviour. In particular, this literature finds 
that only a small fraction of firms sell their output in 
foreign markets. Moreover, exporting firms tend to be 
more productive and larger, and they usually sell only 
a small proportion of their output abroad. For instance, 
Bernard and others (2003) use data for United States 
plants to find three sets of facts. First, only 21% of 
plants in the United States Census of Manufacturers 
report some exports. Of those, most sell less than 
10% of their total output abroad, while fewer than 
5% of exporting plants export more than 50% of their 
production. Second, exporters are larger, shipping on 
average 5.6 times more than non-exporters. Finally, the 
productivity of exporters is substantially higher than 
that of non-exporting firms. Eaton and others (2008) 
show a similar pattern using French manufacturing 
firm-level data.5
Recently developed theoretical models of international 
trade with heterogeneous firms and fixed and variable 
costs are able to account for these facts. In Melitz 
(2003), the economy is characterized by heterogeneous 
firms producing in monopolistic markets and by intra-
industry selection through productivity. Firms face 
initial uncertainty concerning their future productivity 
when making an irreversible investment decision that 
allows them to enter the domestic market. In addition 
5  For additional results, see Bernard and Jensen (1999), Bernard and 
others (2007), Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1988) and Melitz (2008).
to this sunk entry cost, firms face both fixed and per-
unit export costs. Arkolakis (2008) also develops a 
model with heterogeneous firms. In this model, firms 
face market penetration costs. Similarly, Bernard and 
others (2003) develop a model of Ricardian differences 
in technological efficiency and imperfect competition 
with variable mark-ups. This class of models predicts 
that only a subset of relatively productive firms export, 
whereas the remaining, less productive firms serve the 
domestic market only. 
In this section we analyse these exporter facts. 
In the next section we look into the dynamics of 
export growth. We use data from the National Annual 
Manufacturing Industry Survey (enia), an annual survey 
of manufacturing conducted by the Chilean statistics 
agency, the National Institute of Statistics (ine). The 
enia covers all manufacturing plants employing at least 
10 individuals. Thus, it includes all newly created and 
existing plants with 10 or more employees, and it excludes 
plants that have ceased activities or reduced their payroll 
below the survey’s threshold. We observe plants and not 
firms in our data set and thus are unable to distinguish 
single-plant firms from multi-plant firms.6 
The data available extend from 1979 to 2007 and 
contain detailed information on plant characteristics such 
as manufacturing subsector at the four-digit International 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (isic) level, sales, employment, investment, 
6  According to information provided by Central Bank of Chile 




the overall liberalization strategy. A decade later Chile 
had signed trade agreements with many of the world’s 
economies. Today, more than 90% of Chilean exports 
are subject to a trade agreement. 
Summing up, it was only from the late 1980s 
that the Chilean economy was able fully to reap the 
benefits of the changes in economic incentives and the 
new productive structure that came with trade reforms. 
Overall, exports evolved consistently, booming during 
most of the period. Figure 2 shows that total exports 
increased sevenfold from 1975 to 2010 —much faster 
than gdp, which increased fivefold. Manufacturing exports 
followed a similar pattern, almost doubling as a share of 
manufacturing sales, as the proportion increased from 
12.3% to 21.1% over the 1990-2007 period.4 
4  In our analysis we have considered all manufacturing sectors except 
copper. See below for a discussion.
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intermediate inputs and location. Data on plant-level 
exports have been collected since 1990, and accordingly 
our analysis covers the 1990-2007 period.7 
All nominal variables were deflated at the three-
digit isic level, using deflators constructed from the 
wholesale price indices compiled by ine. Capital series 
were constructed using information on investment and 
depreciation, following the strategy of Bergoeing and 
others (2005). Our analysis considers all 29 three-digit 
isic sectors except copper production (sector 372), since 
the national accounts include copper in the mining sector 
and not in manufacturing. Moreover, copper has been 
a major export commodity since long before trade was 
liberalized. Over the 18 years considered, sector 372 
represents an average of 22% of total value added in 
the enia. 
The data show that Chilean plants display many 
similarities to their United States counterparts as described 
by the literature, as well as some differences. Table 1 
summarizes our basic findings. First, the proportions of 
7  The ine changed the plant identification method in the 1996 survey. 
Fortunately, we had access to three databases that allowed us to match 
up almost all the surveyed plants over time. The 1979-1996 data set 
and the 1995-2007 set do not have a common identifier, but a third 
survey covering the years from 1995 to 2007 had both identifiers for 
the year 2000. To match up plants that were not in the 2000 survey, 
we looked for plants that in any given year reported identical values 
for relevant variables such as wages, number of days in operation, isic 
code, electricity consumed, value added tax (vat) paid, number of 
employees, gross output and machinery and equipment investment.
manufacturing plants that export are almost the same. 
According to the enia, 78.9% of plants sell all their 
production in domestic markets, whereas 21.1% sell 
some output abroad. Export intensity, i.e., the share of 
total output exported, is much higher in Chile, however. 
For instance, over 25% of Chilean plants that export 
sell more than 50% of their output abroad, whereas 
only 5% of such plants in the United States do (Bernard 
and others, 2003). This fact suggests that local market 
size might play a role in shaping the distribution of 
export intensity.
Second, just as in the United States, the labour 
productivity of Chilean exporters is much higher than that 
of non-exporters. Figure 3 shows that the distribution of 
exporters’ plant-level productivity (sector/year averages) 
is located to the right of their non-exporting counterparts. 
According to the results in table 1, the productivity of 
plants that export is 38% higher, on average, than the 
productivity of the typical plant producing in the same 
three-digit sector, whereas the productivity of those that 
do not export is 10% lower. This 48 percentage point 
gap is much larger than the one described for the United 
States by Bernard and others (2003), which amounts to 
33%. This difference is consistent with the existence of 
cross-country variability in export market entry costs. 
Table 1 also shows that exporters are larger than 
non-exporting plants when characterized by the number 
of employees (89% on average). Moreover, exporters 
average higher capital/labour ratios and lower shares of 
wages in total value added. Chile is a low-wage country, 
TABLE 1












 Gap relative to sector simple average (three-digit isic)
No exports 78.9 –10 –15 3 –19
Positive exports 21.1 38 58 -12 70




Gap relative to sector simple average 
  0 to 10 48.8 42 54 -12 76
10 to 20 11.0 36 58 -9 70
20 to 30 5.8 37 65 -10 76
30 to 40 5.0 25 42 -5 55
40 to 50 4.2 36 65 -14 72
50 to 60 4.2 27 51 -8 69
60 to 70 4.5 44 68 -17 57
70 to 80 5.0 30 53 -14 60
80 to 90 5.4 38 55 -12 61
90 to 100 6.1 37 57 -19 54
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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and one would thus expect exporters to be more labour-
intensive. Several explanations may account for this 
seeming anomaly. First, manufactured goods are sold 
mostly to other Latin American countries. Therefore, 
it is not necessarily the case that Chile can be defined 
as a labour-abundant country in this context. Second, 
non-exporters are more likely to be liquidity-constrained 
and thus might face higher capital costs. Third, as 
explained by Trefler (1993), labour should be measured 
in effective units. If not, human capital, a scarce resource 
in Chile relative to developed economies, is included 
in total labour. 
Finally, the table shows that these characteristics 
are not necessarily correlated with plant export intensity, 
i.e., there is no clear tendency for plants that export a 
larger share of their sales to be more productive, larger 
or more capital-intensive. 
In what follows, we further analyse the role of plant-
level heterogeneity on exports and productivity, this time 
looking at the mechanisms underlying their dynamics.
FIGURE 3



























































































The microdynamics of Chilean exports
Recent international trade theories predict that increasing 
exposure to foreign markets due, for instance, to a fall 
in transport costs leads to a reallocation of inputs and 
production towards the most productive firms. As the 
cost of entering export markets falls, firms that used to 
sell their output in domestic markets only now find it 
profitable to pay the costs of selling abroad. If variable 
costs fall, then old exporters increase their export intensity, 
whereas if fixed costs fall, these firms do not change their 
sales patterns. In any case, the least productive firms 
are forced to exit as the increased demand for domestic 
inputs bids up real production costs. The reallocation 
driven by the increased exposure to trade delivers gains 
in terms of aggregate productivity growth.
A number of recent papers have looked at the 
effects of trade on productivity dynamics. Bernard and 
others (2007) show that productivity growth is faster 
in industries with falling trade costs. Low-productivity 
plants in these industries are more likely to exit, whereas 
high-productivity non-exporters are more likely to 
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start selling abroad. In the aggregate, their results are 
consistent with productivity-enhancing reallocation 
effects associated with trade growth.8 
Bernard and Jensen (2004) study the recent export 
boom in the United States by examining the role of 
entry, firm expansion and export intensity. The paper 
finds that most of the increase in manufacturing exports 
came from rising export intensity at existing exporters 
rather than from new entrants into exporting. They also 
find that changes in exchange rates and rises in foreign 
income drove most of the export boom, while within-
plant productivity increases played a smaller role. 
Other papers suggest a major role for entry into 
exporting, however. For example, Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) 
examine the bilateral trade patterns by commodity of 
countries involved in significant trade liberalization 
processes, finding a striking relationship between a 
good’s pre-liberalization share of trade and its subsequent 
growth. The goods that were traded the least before 
liberalization account for a disproportionate share of 
trade following the reduction of trade barriers. They 
interpret this evidence as supporting the role of the new 
goods margin as a source of trade expansion. 
Plant-level data for Chile have also been used 
to study the connection between trade liberalization 
and firm dynamics by Pavcnik (2002), Irarrázabal and 
Opromolla (2007) and Álvarez and Vergara (2010). Using 
a difference-in-differences approach and data for the 
1979-1986 period, Pavcnik (2002) shows that plants in 
export-oriented and import-competing sectors became 
more productive by the end of the sample period. An 
important caveat of this work is that, as figure 1 shows, 
tariffs were much higher in 1986 than in 1979: the actual 
direction of trade openness is opposite to that assumed 
by the study. 
Irarrázabal and Opromolla (2007) use the Bernard 
and others (2003) model to simulate the effects of the 
Chilean liberalization. The model predicts that a 50% 
reduction in trade barriers leads to a 24% change in 
aggregate productivity. About 72% of the gains are due 
to within-plant gains and 26% to the exit of less efficient 
plants. Reallocation and entry effects are quantitatively 
unimportant. Their simulation results do not single out 
the effects due to entry into export markets, however, or 
reallocation towards the most productive exporters; they 
focus on aggregate market effects without distinguishing 
8  It is worth noting that Bernard and others (2007) use United 
States import cost measures rather than export cost measures in their 
analysis. The correlation between these trade cost measures is not 
necessarily positive.
exporter from non-exporter behaviour. Thus, one of 
the predicted channels of productivity gains, entry into 
export markets, cannot be accounted for from their 
results.9 Álvarez and Vergara (2010) do study how trade 
liberalization, among other market reforms, could affect 
exit decisions. Using data for Chilean manufacturing 
plants during the period from 1979 to 2000, they find 
that exit is more likely in export-oriented industries. 
Table 2 suggests that heterogeneity has in fact played 
a major role in Chile’s export boom. The table shows 
that 78.5% of the total change in the real level of exports 
is accounted for by new exporters. That is, plants that 
were either not in the market or not exporting in 1990 
contributed greatly to the total increase in exports. By 
way of comparison, Bernard and Jensen (2004) report 
that entry accounted for a 67% share of the United 
States export boom.10 Continuing plants contributed the 
remaining 35.6% of this increase. Finally, since exiting 
plants reduced the rise in exports by 14.1%, net entry 
contributed 64.4% of total growth, a larger share than 
reported for the United States (39%).
In this section, we use Chilean plant data to further 
analyse the role of this micro level heterogeneity in 
explaining the recent export boom. We perform three 
main exercises, each focusing on different aspects of plant 
behaviour and its consequences for aggregate growth. 
In the first, we ask whether the aggregate export boom 
is mostly explained by changes in export intensity (the 
fraction of total output that is sold abroad) or by a growing 
fraction of plants exporting. Second, we examine whether 
there are differences in this export intensity across new, 
continuing and failing exporters that can account for the 
aggregate dynamics. In the third and final exercise we 
look into aggregate productivity behaviour and how it 
correlates with the evolution of exports. 
9  Moreover, the model is calibrated for exporter facts as of 1992 
(productivity and sales advantage of exporters relative to non-exporters). 
Thus, it is implicitly assumed that the 1992 productivity structure is 
representative of the pre-liberalization structure. The model is then 
simulated to study the effects of reducing trade barriers, mimicking 
falling trade costs between 1975 and early 1980, so their results 
might underestimate the true gains from the reallocation of resources 
among firms that was driven by the liberalization of Chilean trade. 
The authors had to calibrate the model on the basis of 1990s data, as 
the enia covers export behaviour only since then.
10  Bernard and Jensen (2004) report that the United States export boom 
is mostly explained by existing exporters rather than by entry. However, 
the paper defines new exporters as plants that were exporting in 1992 
and were not producing in 1987, even for the domestic market. We 
believe that classifying new exporters that were previously producing 
as continuers understates the scale of entry into export markets. Once 
we relax this restriction, entry accounts for 67% of the United States 
export boom, instead of 29% as reported in the paper.
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1. Export entry and intensity effects 
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of aggregate manufacturing 
exports in the enia over our sample period. The graph shows 
that exports rose steadily over most of the sample period. 
The figure also shows the evolution of the fraction 
of plants that export and of aggregate export intensity. 
The fraction of exporting plants grew steadily until 1995. 
It then dropped slightly until the early 2000s, when it 
started to increase again. By 2002 it had returned to the 
1995 level, with about 21.8% of plants selling output 
abroad. By 2007, the share had increased to 24.8%. 
Total exports and the proportion of sales made 
abroad evolved similarly over the sample period. Table 3 
presents the evolution at the three-digit isic level. The 
table shows that exports grew much faster than sales in 
most sectors, leading to a rise in export intensity. For 
the full sample, the ratio of manufacturing exports over 
sales grew from 0.12 to 0.21 in just 10 years. Similarly, 
table 4 presents the evolution of the export intensity 
distribution. The distribution had shifted clearly to the 
right by the end of the sample period. The fraction of 
total plants that exported also rose over the period, from 
17.5% in 1990-1991 to 24.4% in 2006-2007. 
Table 5 separates out total export growth into the 
percentage growth in the number of exporters and the 
growth of average exports per plant. Columns (2) to (4) 
present this decomposition for total real sales, while 
columns (5) to (7) show the real export figures, both in 




(billions of 2000 dollars)
2007
(billions of 2000 dollars)
Difference
(billions of 2000 dollars)
Contribution 
(percentage)
All sectors    
 All 2 720 12 113 9 392 100.0
 Continuing 1 391 4 736 3 344 35.6
 Entering 7 377 7 377 78.5
 Exiting 1 329 –1 329 –14.1
 Net entry 1 329 7 377 6 048 64.4
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Exports and sales divided by nominal exchange rate and deflated by United States gdp deflator. Only plants with export and sales 
data are included. Total sales for exporters only.
FIGURE 4
Chile: Proportion of plants exporting and export intensity
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TABLE 3





Percentage of sales exported Difference
1990/1991-2006/2007  1990-1991 2006-2007  Percentage points Percentage
311 1.78 18.81 28.28 9.47 50.3
312 3.45 3.16 4.85 1.68 53.2
313 8.39 7.95 21.34 13.39 168.4
314 –1.00 3.15 0.00 –3.15 –100.0
321 0.49 4.85 13.15 8.30 171.1
322 –0.49 5.73 2.35 –3.38 –59.0
323 18.84 1.08 26.13 25.05 2 329.0
324 –0.93 9.27 0.81 –8.46 –91.3
331 3.61 30.14 46.07 15.93 52.9
332 –0.37 6.33 5.19 –1.14 –18.0
341 3.77 29.88 53.71 23.82 79.7
342 0.18 3.41 3.06 –0.35 –10.3
351 6.58 34.63 12.90 –21.73 –62.8
352 1.10 6.49 8.02 1.53 23.6
353 –1.00 3.26 0.00 –3.26 –100.0
354 –0.89 2.62 0.49 –2.14 –81.4
355 2.80 13.52 29.54 16.02 118.5
356 13.35 1.47 7.40 5.94 405.2
361 3.66 14.20 24.36 10.16 71.6
362 9.11 2.14 7.15 5.01 234.3
369 1.94 1.23 1.35 0.12 9.5
371 5.81 31.39 45.48 14.09 44.9
381 2.74 2.71 4.88 2.17 80.3
382 12.34 1.33 9.44 8.12 611.6
383 8.63 1.87 9.31 7.43 396.8
384 3.33 5.82 15.43 9.62 165.3
385 30.17 2.90 15.75 12.84 442.5
390 13.10 2.65 13.17 10.52 396.4
All 3.17 12.26 21.08 8.81 71.9
Mean 5.4 9.0 14.6 5.6 62.5
25th percentile 0.4 2.6 4.4 1.8 66.3
50th percentile 3.4 4.1 9.4 5.2 126.9
75th percentile 8.5  10.3 22.1  11.8 113.8
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a Nominal Chilean pesos were converted into 2000 dollars deflated by the annual average nominal exchange rate and the United States 
gdp deflator.
domestic and foreign) grew by 96% over the period. This 
growth is mostly explained by changes in average sales 
per plant, as the number of plants decreased during the 
period. Interestingly, the results for export growth are 
significantly different. First, total exports grew by much 
more, with a rise of 149%. Second, more than 80% of 
this growth is explained by the expansion of exports per 
plant, whereas less than 20% is due to the number of 
plants exporting. The rapid growth of exports per plant 
relative to sales per plant confirms the fact that exporters 
are much larger than average. 
These figures, however, do not reveal differences 
across plants in terms of their export status (new, 
old and failing exporters). To estimate their relative 
contribution, we measure the significance of each 
margin by plant type as a source of the export boom. 
That is, we look not only at the number of plants and the 
fraction of sales exported, but also at the contribution 
of continuers, exiters and new exporters. For instance, 
if new exporters export a larger share of their sales than 
existing exporters, even a small entry of plants may end 
up contributing greatly to export growth. To examine 
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TABLE 4
Chile: Export intensity and exporters
(Percentages)
Period 1990-2007 1990-1991 2006-2007
Plants:
No exports 78.9 82.5 75.6
Some exports 21.1 17.5 24.4
Export intensity of exporters (percentage) Percentage of exporting plants
  0 to 10 48.8 52.2 43.2
10 to 20 11.0 8.3 11.7
20 to 30 5.8 6.0 6.9
30 to 40 5.0 4.1 5.5
40 to 50 4.2 3.3 4.3
50 to 60 4.2 4.3 4.0
60 to 70 4.5 4.5 4.4
70 to 80 5.0 5.9 5.3
80 to 90 5.4 5.7 5.9
90 to 100 6.1 5.7 8.9
Source: Authors’ calculations.
this decomposition, we break down the increase in 

































where ∆X1990-2007 is the aggregate change in exports 
during the period; C, EN and EX denote the number 
of continuing exporters, new exporters and failed 
exporters, respectively; and Xit is exports by plant type 
i, where i = old, new and failed exporters, at period 
t. Thus, exports may rise because continuing plants 
become larger on average, because new exporters are 
larger than failed exporters, or because the number of 
exporting plants increases.
In addition, we decompose the increase in exports into 
changes in the intensity and sales of continuing exporters 
and the net entry of exporting plants (the contribution of 




















































where St denotes sales in period t. The first and second 
terms represent the contribution of changes in intensity 
and sales, respectively, at continuing plants; the third 
term is the contribution by new exporters; and the final 
term represents the (negative) contribution of failed 
exporters. 
Tables 6 and 7 display these decompositions. 
When the total export change is decomposed into the 
contributions of changing size, intensity and number 
of exporters, net entry contributes 64.4% of export 
expansion, as already shown in table 2. Of this total net 
entry contribution, 48.3 percentage points are driven 
by the higher export intensity of the new net exporters. 
The remaining 16.1 percentage points are due to a rise 
in the net number of exporting plants. In other words, 
the net entry contribution is the combined result of 
two elements. First, entering plants are larger (average 
exports per plant) than failing exporters, accounting for 
48.3 out of 64.4 percentage points. Second, there is a 
positive net entry of plants, an effect that accounts for 
the remaining 16.1 percentage points. Similarly, 35.6% 
of the change in exports is explained by the growth of 
continuing plants. The findings for sales are similar, 
although the contribution of net entry due to changes 
in the number of producers is 29.8 percentage points, 
almost twice as large as for exports. 
Table 7 breaks down total export growth into export 
intensity and sales effects by the exporting status of the 
plant. The results provide further support for the idea 
that new exporters are the largest source of the observed 
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TABLE 5
Chile: sales, exports and exporters














1990 21 876.062 4.810 4 548 2 720.005 3.671 741
1991 24 176.018 5.112 4 729 2 927.437 3.282 892
1992 28 062.938 5.724 4 903 3 342.719 3.468 964
1993 29 274.228 5.854 5 001 3 601.731 3.477 1 036
1994 31 495.799 6.237 5 050 4 467.098 4.072 1 097
1995 38 376.925 7.168 5 354 6 353.077 5.444 1 167
1996 40 262.537 7.088 5 680 6 262.309 5.271 1 188
1997 40 930.461 7.498 5 459 6 585.138 5.696 1 156
1998 37 872.972 7.268 5 211 5 850.343 5.348 1 094
1999 35 032.950 7.182 4 878 6 090.689 6.171 987
2000 36 476.860 7.773 4 693 5 328.199 5.693 936
2001 31 574.216 7.414 4 259 6 066.539 6.623 916
2002 31 596.902 6.946 4 549 6 547.966 6.601 992
2003 35 851.179 7.911 4 532 6 925.204 6.776 1 022
2004 43 035.311 8.984 4 790 9 397.054 8.899 1 056
2005 55 024.890 12.357 4 453 10 768.812 10.121 1 064
2006 54 779.590 12.865 4 258 11 445.921 10.901 1 050
2007 57 034.922 14.202 4 016 12 112.502 12.186 994
∆1990-2007 (%) 96 108 –12 149 120 29
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Exports and sales divided by the nominal exchange rate and deflated by the United States gdp deflator.
TABLE 6
Chile: Contribution of average exports and exporters
Exports Sales
Continuing exporters
Total change (millions of 2000 dollars) 3 344 414 10 308 396
Amount per firm (millions of 2000 dollars)
 1990 6 562 27 066
 2007 22 338 75 690
Number of firms 212 212
net entry into export markets
Total change (millions of 2000 dollars) 6 048 083 24 850 464
Amount per firm (millions of 2000 dollars)
 Entering 9 433 52 415
 Exiting 2 512 30 507
number of firms
 Entering 782 782
 Exiting 529 529
Contribution (percentage of total change)
Continuers 35.6 29.3
Net entry 64.4 70.7
 Due to ∆ in average exports and sales 48.3 40.9
 Due to ∆ in number of exporters 16.1 29.8
Source: Authors’ calculations.
∆: Change or difference.
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rise in exports, because almost the whole of the export 
expansion is associated with new exporting plants. 
Meanwhile, the continuing plants’ 35.6 percentage point 
contribution is explained by a 6.1 percentage point rise 
in export intensity and a 29.5 point rise in sales. 
2. Productivity gains
New trade theories stress that exposure to foreign 
competition induces productivity-enhancing resource 
reallocation across economic units. In this section, we 
analyse the importance of reallocation in generating 
productivity gains during the Chilean export boom. This 
hypothesis is contrasted with the role of within-plant 
productivity gains that may result from international 
competition. Flows of knowledge from international 
markets and exposure to more intense competition may 
induce exporting plants to become more productive.11
To this end, we construct aggregate industry measures 
of labour productivity as the weighted average of plant-








s is aggregate labour productivity in period 
t in sector S, and fjst is the share of plant j’s output in 
the total output of sector S in period t. Finally, prodjst 
is the labour productivity at time t of plant j producing 
in sector S.
We quantify changes in this aggregate productivity 
measure due to reallocation of production factors across 
plants and within-plant productivity gains by using the 
11  In a complementary study, Álvarez and López (2008) analyse 
whether there are spillover effects from exporting plants, finding a 
positive impact on the productivity of local suppliers. 
cross-sectional decomposition of Olley and Pakes (1996). 
That is, we can write prodst as:
 
prod prod
f f prod prod
s s




1∑ ( )= ( )− −
= +t t
 (4)
The first term of the decomposition is the (unweighted) 
average cross-sectional mean of productivity across all 
plants in sector S and year t. The second term describes 
whether production is disproportionately located at 
plants with higher productivity. In other words, the 
first term is associated with within-plant productivity 
gains, whereas the second term is a covariance term that 
indicates whether the largest share of output is being 
produced by the most productive plants.
Table 8 depicts the evolution of prodt averaged at the 
sectoral level in manufacturing, with prod normalized to 
1 in 1990. The table also shows the relative importance 
of the evolution of the simple average and the cross term 
as described in the decomposition above. The figures 
indicate that reallocation towards more productive plants 
has become more substantial over the last two decades. 
That is, not only is this covariance term positive, but 
its contribution to aggregate productivity has become 
larger over time. In what follows we examine whether 
the observed total growth in productivity and each of 
its components is associated with export behaviour. 
Although we are not able to identify causal effects, the 
regressions below can be interpreted as describing the 
correlation between aggregate productivity growth, 
reallocation effects and exports.
To do this, we estimate models such as:
 ln * ln *prod X trendst s s st= +α β δ ε+ +t t  (5)
TABLE 7




(Millions of 2000 dollars)
 Contribution to export rise 
(Percentages)
 1990 2007  1990 2007  ∆ intensity ∆ sales Total
Continuing exporters 24.2 29.5 5 737 916 16 046 312 6.11 29.50 35.6
New exporters 18.0 40 988 610 78.5
Failed exporters 8.2 16 138 146 –14.1
Net entry –8.2 18.0  –16 138 146 40 988 610    64.4
Source: Authors’ calculations.
∆: Change or difference.
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where Xst denotes exports in sector S at period t, αs is a 
sector fixed effect, prodst is a measure of productivity, 
and trendt is a time trend. 
Regression results are displayed in table 9. The 
left-hand panel of the table uses ordinary least squares 
(ols) as the estimation method. The first column of the 
table estimates an elasticity of aggregate productivity 
to exports equal to 0.052. Thus, growth in exports is 
correlated with growth in aggregate labour productivity. 
The effect is statistically significant and economically 
relevant, especially given that exports doubled over the 
sample period. 
The second column uses the simple average of 
labour productivity as the endogenous variable to find 
an elasticity of 0.04. This finding indicates that export 
growth is indeed correlated with plants’ productivity 
gains. The third column replicates the first exercise, now 
controlling for the natural log of the simple average of 
productivity. Thus, the estimated elasticity of weighted 
productivity to exports captures the covariance term in 
the decomposition. Our result shows that this reallocation 
term is indeed significantly correlated with export growth; 
that is, as exports grow, output increasingly comes from 
the most productive plants. The fourth column uses the 
relative importance of the covariance term directly as the 
dependent variable. Now we find no evidence of significant 
elasticity, although the estimated effect is positive.
The right-hand panel of the table repeats these 
exercises using a robust regression framework to 
downweight outliers. We now find that all estimated 
elasticities are positive and statistically significant. 
TABLE 8
Chile: olley-Pakes decomposition of labour 
productivity 
(Simple averages by sector)
Year Total Simple average Cross term
1990 1.00 0.85 0.15
1991 1.08 0.83 0.17
1992 1.17 0.81 0.19
1993 1.26 0.80 0.20
1994 1.27 0.82 0.18
1995 1.40 0.81 0.19
1996 1.55 0.79 0.21
1997 1.60 0.80 0.20
1998 1.65 0.79 0.21
1999 1.71 0.81 0.19
2000 1.82 0.78 0.22
2001 1.96 0.77 0.23
2002 2.08 0.81 0.19
2003 2.09 0.82 0.18
2004 2.16 0.75 0.25
2005 2.40 0.76 0.24
2006 2.52 0.77 0.23
2007 2.74 0.80 0.20
Source: Authors’ calculations.
TABLE 9
Chile: Exports and labour productivity
Labour productivity (deflated) Cross term Labour productivity (deflated) Cross term
Weighted Unweighted Weighted fraction Weighted Unweighted Weighted fraction
Exports (ln) 0.052 0.040 0.025 0.004 0.026 0.052 0.017 0.011
(3.70)** (2.73)** (2.46)* (0.41) (2.20)* (4.94)** (2.44)* (2.39)*
lp unweighted 0.679  0.809
(17.72)**  (29.89)**
Year 0.049 0.041 0.021 0.007 0.051 0.039 0.013 0.004
 (18.51)** (14.94)** (8.51)** (3.61)** (22.75)** (19.64)** (7.73)** (4.62)**
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.76 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.93
Regression ols Robust regression
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
lp: Labour productivity
Summing up, our results suggest that productivity 
and exports have co-moved over the Chilean boom. 
Moreover, as exports have expanded, there has been a 
productivity-enhancing reallocation of resources towards 
the most efficient plants. These trends are consistent with 
the predictions of the new theories of heterogeneous 
plants and trade. 
101
DIssECtIng tHE CHILEAn ExPoRt BooM  •  RAPHAEL BERgoEIng, ALEjAnDRo MICCo AnD AnDREA REPEtto
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 5  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 1
This paper uses almost two decades of Chilean plant-
level manufacturing data to empirically investigate 
the relationship between exports, plant dynamics and 
productivity. We find that 64.4% of the increase in 
exports over the years from 1990 to 2007 was due to 
the net entry of new exporters. About two thirds of this 
net entry contribution is associated with the larger size 
(average exports per plant) of new exporters; only a third 
is related to the increase in the number of exporters. 
Additionally, the export intensity (exports over sales) 
of new exporters was more than double that of failing 
exporters. Overall, even though exporters in Chile remain 
a minority among domestic producers and usually sell 
only a small fraction of their output abroad, as reported 
by Bernard and Jensen (1995) for developed economies, 
figures have increased during the last two decades. The 
bilateral trade agreements that came to supplement the 
previous unilateral liberalization strategy in the early 1990s 
may have favoured new and more intensive exporters by 
reducing foreign market penetration costs. 
We also show that productivity and exports have 
co-moved over the Chilean boom. Moreover, the export 
expansion has been associated with a productivity-
enhancing reallocation of resources towards more 
efficient plants. 
The aggregate effect on productivity is a topic that 
requires further research, however, as other margins 
not analysed here may be affected. For instance, 
Atkenson and Burstein (2010) suggest that there may 
be countervailing effects, since increases in exporters’ 
innovative activity might diminish productivity innovation 
undertaken by smaller companies primarily serving 
domestic markets. 
Finally, future research should address the role of 
natural resources as a driver of Chile’s export boom. 
Although non-copper exports have shown increasing 
diversification in terms of markets and products 
(Berthelon, 2011), natural resources still predominate 
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